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The purpose of this article is to analyze how competitive forces may influence the way media 
firms like TV channels raise revenue. A media firm can either be financed by advertising 
revenue, by direct payment from the viewers (or the readers, if we consider newspapers), or 
by both. We show that the scope for raising revenues from consumer payment is constrained 
by other media firms offering close substitutes. This implies that the less differentiated the 
media firms’ content, the larger is the fraction of their revenue coming from advertising. A 
media firm’s scope for raising revenues from ads, on the other hand, is constrained by how 
many competitors it faces. We should thus expect that direct payment from the media 
consumers becomes more important the larger the number of competing media products. 
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 1 Introduction
In December 2005, after years of planning and months of testing, CNN launched its
Pipeline service where viewers could subscribe to live breaking news online at a price
of $ 24.95 a year ($ 2.95 a month, $ 0.99 a day). One and a half years later, CNN
removed its subscription fee on Pipeline and replaced it with a free ad-supported ser-
vice.1 In September 2005, New York Times introduced TimesSelect, which charged
$ 49.95 a year or $ 7.95 a month for online access to its columnists and news archive.
Two years later, the fee was removed. Vivian L. Schiller, general manager of the
site explained the change in strategy as follows: ￿ our projections for growth in the
subscription base were low, compared to the growth in online advertising￿(New York
Times, 2007). These, and many other examples, indicate that business models with
revenues from subscription fees have become increasingly less viable on the Internet.
However, in the traditional TV industry we observe the opposite trend. In 2003,
subscription revenues were larger than advertising revenues for the ￿rst time in the
UK TV market (Ofcom, 2005). By 2007, the same was true in the USA.2
How can we explain that ￿nancing seems to shift from subscription to advertising
in one media market, and in the opposite direction in another media market? The
purpose of this article is to introduce a theory that can help us to resolve this puzzle.
We show that competition and strategic interactions between media ￿rms may be
decisive for their choice of ￿nancing. To capture the role of competition, we allow
both the degree of content di⁄erentiation between the media ￿rms￿products and
the number of media ￿rms to vary (e.g. the number of newspapers or TV channels).
It turns out that these two competitive forces are qualitatively di⁄erent. On the
1See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CNN_Pipeline.
2According to TNS Media Intelligence, the revenues from advertising on TV in the
US rose from $ 54.4 bn in 2003 to $ 63.8 bn in 2007, see for example http://www.tns-
mi.com/news/03252008.htm concerning the ￿gures for 2007. The revenues from subscriptions




1one hand, the scope for raising revenues from consumer payment is constrained by
other media ￿rms o⁄ering close substitutes. On the other hand, the scope for raising
revenues from ads is constrained by the number of media ￿rms.
To understand our results, consider two or more TV channels which are so dif-
ferentiated that they have (close to) monopoly power in their own viewer segments.
This market power can be utilized to set high consumer prices. However, if the
di⁄erentiation between the TV channels is reduced, each will have incentives to
lower its consumer price in order to attract viewers from its rivals (demand becomes
more elastic). Better substitutability between the channels thereby puts a downward
pressure on viewer charges. Actually, the channels will not be able to set consumer
prices higher than marginal costs if the viewers perceive the channels as perfect
substitutes (and the ￿rms have equal marginal costs). We therefore arrive at the
standard textbook result that revenue from consumer payments is monotonically
decreasing in the substitutability between the products.
The same is not true with regard to revenue from the advertising market. The
reason is that when consumers dislike advertising, competition in advertising prices
is distinctively di⁄erent from competition in consumer prices. As we should expect
from more traditional markets, a ￿rm that lowers its advertising price will sell more
advertising space. However, since advertising on the margin is a nuisance for the
audience, this will make the other media ￿rms￿products more attractive for the
consumers. All else equal, media ￿rms will consequently be reluctant to compete by
setting low advertising prices. More technically, we show that it is a fundamental
characteristic of the media market that advertising prices are strategic substitutes
while consumer prices are strategic complements. From the literature it is well
known that competition is tougher on strategic complements than on strategic sub-
stitutes. Contrary to what is the case with consumer payments, a smaller channel
di⁄erentiation will therefore not reduce advertising revenue. Indeed, we show that
the opposite is true; the less di⁄erentiated the media products are from the audience￿
point of view, the higher is the revenue from advertising.
Next, suppose that the number of TV channels increases. The viewers will then
be spread over a larger number of channels. This, in turn, reduces any individual TV
2channel￿ s market power in the advertising market. As the number of TV channels
increases, the price each can charge for ads approaches marginal costs. But if the
consumers consider the new channels as di⁄erent from those which are already in
the market, each channel will still have some market power in the viewer market,
and will therefore always be able to make a positive pro￿t from direct consumer
payments. Our model thereby predicts that consumer payments are relatively more
important as a source of revenue the greater the number of TV channels.
Our predictions are consistent with casual observations from several media mar-
kets. The total number of printed newspapers has gone down the last couple of
decades, while at the same time we have witnessed an increase in the number of
purely advertising-￿nanced newspapers. This indicates that a reduction in the num-
ber of printed newspapers has led to a larger fraction of their revenues being gen-
erated by advertising.3 In the TV market we observe the opposite. The number
of commercial TV channels has increased, and direct payments from the viewers
have become more and more important relative to advertising revenues. Casual
observations also indicate that the newspapers and TV channels which are most
di⁄erentiated from their rivals, are the ones that are best able to charge the con-
sumers. This is most obvious on the internet; a high reliance on ad revenue seems
to be the only viable business model for electronic newspapers which cannot o⁄er
unique content.
Finally, our model predicts that media products that are mainly advertising-
￿nanced have relatively large audiences. Again, competition is the driving force.
To see why, note that media products which the consumers perceive to be good
substitutes will have low market power. Such media products must therefore be
sold on relatively favorable terms to the consumers. Thus, the size of the audience
increases. This is not because the media ￿rms seek a broad audience as such,
but because the competitive pressure forces them to behave so that they attract
a larger audience. This prediction is consistent with the observation that pay-TV
channels and newspapers with few close substitutes typically have high prices and
3As pointed out by one of the referees, the drop in the number of printed newspapers might be
due to a negative demand shock on the reader side of the market.
3small audiences.
Several studies of the media industry focus on program scheduling and, in par-
ticular, on the well-known ￿ lead-in￿e⁄ect (see, for example, Rust and Eechambadi,
1989, and Shachar and Emerson, 2000).4 Other studies are concerned with the
choice of programming, i.e., what programs to produce (see, for example, Liu et al.,
2004).5 However, none of these studies models the choice of advertising by media
￿rms. More recently, there have been some studies that analyze advertising deci-
sions by media ￿rms.6 The choice of ￿nancing - advertising versus direct payment -
has not been an issue in any of these articles.
The only paper we are aware of, besides our own, that considers media ￿rms
￿nanced partly by advertising and partly by consumer payments, is Godes et al.
(2009).7 One of the novelties of their work is to analyze competition between ￿rms
in di⁄erent media industries, for instance between a newspaper and a TV channel,
an issue not raised here. They also analyze duopolistic competition between media
￿rms in the same industry, highlighting the impact of competition on media ￿rms￿
incentives to underprice (e.g. to sell newspapers at prices below marginal costs
in order to attract readers and earn higher advertising revenue). In contrast, we
provide a systematic discussion of how competition a⁄ects media ￿rms￿sources of
revenue by distinguishing between product di⁄erentiation in the content market
and the number of ￿rms as sources of increased competition. The model of Godes
et al is not equally suitable for this exercise, since they use a framework where
the equilibrium advertising level is independent of the competitive pressure on the
4￿ Lead-in￿refers to TV stations that air popular programs early in the evening to attract viewers
who then continue to watch their channels for the rest of the evening. This topic is also studied
in Goettler and Shachar (2001) and Rust and Alpert (1984). See also Nilssen and Słrgard (1998),
where the program scheduling of news for two competing TV channels is analyzed.
5For a debate concerning their results, see Chou and Wu (2006) and Liu et al. (2006). Pro-
gramming has been an issue in the media-economics literature for a long time, see for example
Steiner (1952), Beebe (1977) and Spence and Owen (1977).
6See Dukes and Gal-Or (2003), Barros et al. (2004), Gabszewicz et al. (2004b), Anderson and
Coate (2005), Gal-Or and Dukes (2006) and Kind et al. (2007).
7Peitz and Valletti (2008) analyze competition between pay-TV and pure free-to-air TV in a
setting where they assume that the latter cannot charge the viewers.
4consumer side, and they limit their analysis to monopoly and duopoly. Besides, they
do not have a unique measure of the di⁄erentiation between media products.
We would like to emphasize that our analysis should not be confused with the
standard theory of two goods being complements in consumption. Complements
are used to describe a situation where an increase in the price of one good causes a
consumer to reduce consumption of both goods, as measured by the change in his
or her compensated demand (see e.g. Kreps 1990, p. 61). A two-sided market, in
contrast, consists of two distinct groups of customers, and the groups may respond
di⁄erently to changes in output on the other side of the market (see Rochet and
Tirole (2003, 2006) for a general discussion). The price of a newspaper, for instance,
is irrelevant for advertisers per se, as are advertising prices for the readers. How-
ever, to the extent that a higher newspaper price translates into reduced sales of
newspapers, demand for ads will typically fall. A lower advertising volume (e.g. due
to higher advertising prices), on the other hand, increases demand for newspapers
if the readers perceive ads as a bad.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present our model,
and we report our equilibrium outcomes in Section 3. In Section 4 we analyze
how competition a⁄ects the media ￿rms￿source of ￿nancing. We ￿rst show that
while price competition is a harsh form of competition in the consumer market, it is
relatively weak in the advertising market. Secondly, we discuss the role of product
di⁄erentiation and the number of ￿rms in explaining the ￿nancing of media ￿rms. In
Section 5 we provide some empirical examples that illustrate how the competitive
forces at work in our model play out in speci￿c cases. Finally, in Section 6, we
conclude and discuss the managerial implications of our results.
2 The model
We consider a media industry where the media ￿rms choose to earn revenue solely
from the advertising market (traditional free-to-air TV and free newspapers), solely
from consumer payments (e.g. pure pay-TV), or from a combination of these two
sources. There are m ￿ 2 competing media ￿rms, and each media ￿rm is o⁄ering
5one media product. The advertising level in media product i = 1;:::;m is denoted
Ai; and consumer demand is denoted Ci. The advertisers and consumers are charged
unit prices equal to ri and pi; respectively. We disregard any production costs, such
that the pro￿t level of media ￿rm i is
￿i = piCi + riAi; i = 1;::;m: (1)
We follow Kind et al. (2007) in assuming that consumer preferences are given



















The parameter s 2 [0;1) is a measure of product di⁄erentiation: The higher s, the
closer substitutes the media products are from the consumers￿point of view (and
the higher is the elasticity of substitution between any pair of goods). We normalize
the population size to one, and may thus interpret Ci as, for example, both the time
that each viewer spends watching channel i and as the number of viewers of channel
i.
The speci￿cation in (2) is due to Shubik and Levitan (1980) and is a modi￿ca-
tion of the standard quadratic utility function (SQU). The reason why we use the
modi￿ed version, is that the SQU poses two problems which make it less suitable for
our purpose. First, under SQU a change in the parameter s would a⁄ect both the
substitutability between the goods and the size of the market. Secondly, the elastic-
ity of substitution would depend on both s and m; making comparative statics with
respect to those two parameters problematic. These problems are not present in
the Shubik-Levitan utility function; with such consumer preferences the size of the
market is independent of s, and the elasticity of substitution between any pair of
goods is independent of m (for any given prices).8 This is important in the present
paper, since our main contribution is to show why a higher substitutability between
8The Shubik-Levitan utility function has consequently been applied in studies where the num-
ber of products varies. See Davidson and Deneckere (1985) and Sha⁄er (1991) for two speci￿c
applications, and Motta (2004) for a general discussion of the virtues of the Shubik-Levitan utility
function over SQU.
6media products could make media ￿rms more dependent on advertising revenue,
while an increase in the number of media products has the opposite e⁄ect. We thus
need a utility function where it is possible to isolate the e⁄ects of changing s and m;
respectively, but except for this we believe that our qualitative results are robust to
the exact speci￿cation of the consumer preferences.9
Consumer surplus depends on the price pi that the consumers are charged for
the media product (e.g. per copy of a newspaper). In addition it depends on the
level of advertising, unless the consumers are indi⁄erent to ads. To capture this
dependency, we let the subjective consumer cost for each unit consumed of media
product i be (pi + ￿iAi), where ￿i measures the consumers￿disutility of the ads.
Consumer surplus is thus given by




This formulation implies that a consumer￿ s disutility from ads in a given media
product is higher the more he consumes of that media product. This captures the
notion that increased consumption of a media product also exposes the consumer
to more of the advertising that the media product carries.
In principle, the parameter ￿i might itself be a function of the advertising level
in media product i: We could for instance assume that consumers have positive
utility of ads (￿i < 0) for relatively small advertising levels (e.g. because ads inform
newspaper readers about retail prices at local stores), but that they perceive ads
to be a nuisance if the advertising level becomes su¢ ciently large: In the former
case ￿iAi may be perceived as a negative indirect price for media product i, and in
the latter case as a positive indirect price. For the majority of media products it is
reasonable to assume that consumers perceive ads as a bad on the margin.10 In order
to highlight the fact that the media ￿rms￿choice of direct prices (pi) and indirect
9In an appendix available upon request we show a possible way of reinterpreting the parameters
under SQU such that the elasticity of substitution between the goods is independent of m; and
where our main results hold for m ￿ 3:
10It is well documented that viewers try to avoid advertising breaks on TV, see Moriarty and
Everett (1994), Danaher (1995) and Wilbur (2008). For printed newspapers, there are less clear
answers as to whether consumers consider advertising as a good or a bad, see e.g. Gabszewicz et
7prices (￿iAi) depends crucially on the competitive pressure, we let ￿i be positive
and constant, and with the same value for each media product in the industry we
consider; ￿i ￿ ￿ _i: By setting @CS=@Ci = 0, we then ￿nd that consumer demand












; i = 1;:::;m; (3)
where A = 1
m
Pm
j=1 Aj is the average level of advertising in the m media products,
and p = 1
m
Pm
j=1 pj is the average (direct) consumer price. Demand for media
product i is thus decreasing in its own price and advertising level, and increasing in
those of its rivals if s > 0. This re￿ ects the fact that the consumers then perceive
the media products as (imperfect) substitutes.
Note that @Ci=@ (￿Ai) = @Ci=@pi < 0; other things equal, sales of media product
i fall by the same amount whether the indirect price (￿Ai) or the direct price (pi)
increases by one unit. We nevertheless show that increased competition between
media ￿rms a⁄ects their choices of direct and indirect prices qualitatively di⁄erently.
Without loss of generality, we choose the unit size of advertising Ai such that we
can put ￿ = 1.
The media ￿rms can raise advertising revenue by selling advertising space to
producers of consumer goods. There are n potential advertisers, and we let Aki ￿ 0
denote producer k￿ s advertising level in media product i. A producer￿ s gross gain
from advertising is naturally increasing in its advertising level and in the number
of media consumers exposed to its advertising. In particular, the bene￿t to an ad-
vertiser from a marginal increase in its advertising level in a given media product
should be larger the more consumers that media ￿rm has. Similarly, the bene￿t to
the advertiser from increased consumption of a media product should be greater the
more advertising he has in that media product. We catch this interaction between
the levels of advertising and media consumption in the simplest possible way by
assuming that advertiser k￿ s gross gain from advertising in media product i equals
￿AkiCi, where ￿ > 0 measures the strength of the advertiser￿ s bene￿t from advertis-
al. (2004a) and Depken and Wilson (2004). Note that this is not inconsistent with our assumption
that on the margin, consumers dislike advertising.















; k = 1;::;n: (4)
Below, we consider a three-stage game. At stage 1, the media ￿rms non-
cooperatively set advertising prices (ri) and consumer prices (pi): At stage 2 the
advertisers choose how much advertising space to buy. At stage 3 the consumers
decide how much to buy of each media product.
We solve the game by backward induction, and the solution to the ￿nal stage is
given by equation (3). Proceeding to the second stage, the ￿rst-order condition for
the advertising level of advertiser k = 1;:::;n in media product i can be written as
@￿k
@Aki













Solving @￿k=@Aki = 0 simultaneously for k = 1;:::;n and i = 1;:::;m we ￿nd a
unique equilibrium where Aki = Ai=n and Akj = Aj=n: This allows us to rewrite
















To see the intuition for (6), suppose ￿rst that n ! 1, so that ri ! ￿Ci: In
the limit, as n approaches in￿nity, an advertiser￿ s willingness to pay for an extra
ad in media product i is thus proportional to the consumption level of that media
product. However, in general each advertiser must take into account the fact that by
increasing the advertising level in media product i; that media product will become
less attractive for the consumers (since the consumers dislike ads) and the other
media products will become more attractive. These e⁄ects are captured by the
terms
@Ci
@Aki < 0 and
@Cj
@Aki > 0 in the brackets of (5) and (6), but they are weaker
the smaller each advertiser￿ s share of total advertising in the media products is (and
vanish in the limit as n ! 1).










￿ (1 ￿ s)ri ￿ sr
i
; i = 1;:::;m; (7)
where r = 1
m
Pm
j=1 rj is the average advertising price at the m outlets.
Equation (7) shows that advertising demand at each outlet is decreasing in its
own price:
@Ai
@ri < 0. Interestingly, it is also decreasing in the other ￿rms￿advertising
prices:
@Ai
@rj < 0; j 6= i. To see the intuition for this, suppose that the advertising
price in one of the media products increases. That media product will then contain
less advertising. Thereby it attracts media consumers from the other ￿rms, which
consequently will observe smaller demand for advertising.
Media consumers and advertisers constitute two di⁄erent groups of customers
(this is one reason why the analysis of two-sided markets di⁄ers from that of com-
plementary goods, as noted in the Introduction). Other things equal, the advertising
price ri is thus irrelevant for the media consumers, as is the consumer price pi for
the advertisers. Equation (7) nonetheless shows that advertising demand at media
￿rm i is decreasing in its consumer price;
@Ai
@pi < 0. However, this is an indirect
e⁄ect, which follows from consumers having downward-sloping demand for each me-
dia product: A higher pi reduces consumption of media product i, making it less
interesting to advertise in this product.
2.1 The nature of competition
An important insight from the model is that competition in advertising prices is
qualitatively di⁄erent from competition in consumer prices. This di⁄erence is nicely
spelled out by use of the notions of strategic substitutes and strategic complements,
due to Bulow, et al. (1985). In essence, ￿rms￿strategic variables are strategic
substitutes if an increase in one ￿rm￿ s variable entails a decrease in the other ￿rms￿
variables, while they are strategic complements if an increase in one ￿rm￿ s variable
entails an increase also in the other ￿rms￿variables; see, e.g., Vives (1999) for further
discussion. We have:
Lemma 1: Advertising prices are strategic substitutes, whereas consumer prices
are strategic complements.



















> 0; 8j 6= i:
Lemma 1 shows that there is a fundamental di⁄erence between the two markets
in which the media ￿rms operate. In the consumer market, an increase in one ￿rm￿ s
price would provide the other ￿rms with incentives to increase their prices too.
This is in accordance with the normal textbook depiction of price competition. As
argued above, things are quite di⁄erent in the advertising market. If media ￿rm i
sets a higher advertising price, it will naturally sell less advertising. However, since
advertising is a nuisance to consumers, consumer demand for media product i will
increase while consumer demand for rival media products will fall. The rivals will
consequently experience a smaller demand for advertising, and thus have incentives
to lower their advertising prices. This e⁄ect seems to be relatively robust, as it
appears in a number of di⁄erent frameworks. See e.g. Nilssen and Słrgard (2001)
and Gabszewicz et al. (2004b).
It could be argued that it is more reasonable to assume that media ￿rms set
advertising quantities rather than advertising prices. First, media ￿rms can pre-
sumably relatively easily decide how much space to allocate to commercials. Godes
et al. (2009), who analyze competition in advertising quantities, provide some ex-
amples where media ￿rms signal that their advertising volume will be relatively low.
Second, media ￿rms may plan in terms of quantities: how many pages of advertis-
ing should there be in a newspaper, and how often should a television program be
interrupted by commercials?
In practice, however, there are no strict physical limits to how much space me-
dia ￿rms can use for advertising. Separate lea￿ ets can for example easily be in-
cluded in newspapers and thereby increase the space for ads quite substantially.
Another example is that TV channels can replace tune-ins with ads to expand the
11volume of commercials (or vice versa). Thus, the ￿rms need to communicate pos-
sibly self-imposed quantity limits to the market. But what we typically observe is
announcement of advertising prices only; it is not common for printed newspapers
to commit to a maximum number of pages with advertising, or for TV channels to
commit to a maximum amount of time for commercials per day. Nor do we observe
that advertisers pay a lower price the more advertising there is in a media product,
which could be an indirect way of committing to a ￿ low￿advertising volume. The
advertising-price scheme is rather based on, for instance, the size of the audience
and the number of minutes the commercial of a given advertiser is shown.
What if the media ￿rms were able to compete in advertising quantities instead of
advertising prices, i.e. if, in contrast to our argumentation, they could make credible
ad quantity commitments? Then they would compete in strategic complements also
on the advertising side of the market. But since this is harsher than competition
in strategic substitutes, they have - not surprisingly - no incentives to make such
commitments (see the Appendix for a proof with m = 2). On the contrary, it is
a dominant strategy for each ￿rm to compete in advertising prices. This indicates
that not only would it be di¢ cult to commit to setting quantities; it would also be
unpro￿table. In line with this, we ￿nd it reasonable to assume that the media ￿rms
set prices on advertising.
3 Equilibrium
The outcome of the two last stages of the game is given by equations (3) and (7),
and we are now ready to ￿nd the solution to the ￿rst stage. In order to simplify the
algebra we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1: Let ￿ = 1:
The consequences of relaxing this assumption are discussed below.
At stage 1, each media ￿rm sets its two prices; one for advertisers and one for
consumers. Solving @￿i=@pi = @￿i=@ri = 0 simultaneously for the m media ￿rms;
subject to consumer demand in (3) and advertising demand in (7), gives rise to a
12unique, symmetric equilibrium. By setting ri = r and pi = p 8i, we ￿nd:
r =
1




m(2 ￿ s) ￿ s
: (9)
Let A and C denote advertising and consumption levels at each media ￿rm in





2 m ￿ 1
[m(2 ￿ s) ￿ s][m(2 ￿ s) + s]
; (10)
C =
(m ￿ s)[m(2 ￿ s) + s] ￿ n
n+1s2 (m ￿ 1)
m[m(2 ￿ s) ￿ s][m(2 ￿ s) + s]
: (11)
Equilibrium pro￿t for each media ￿rm can now be shown to equal
￿ =
s3 (m ￿ 1)
2 (2 ￿ s) n
n+1 + (1 ￿ s)(m ￿ s)[m(2 ￿ s) + s]
2
[m(2 ￿ s) + s]
2 [m(2 ￿ s) ￿ s]
2 : (12)
From (10) - (12) we can now easily verify the following result:
Lemma 2: A larger number of advertisers (higher n) leads to
(i) more advertising (dA=dn > 0),
(ii) reduction in output of each media product (dC=dn < 0), and
(iii) higher pro￿ts for each media ￿rm (d￿=dn > 0).
A larger number of advertisers implies that the demand for ads increases. This
leads to a higher advertising volume in equilibrium, such that consumption of each
media product falls. Despite this, the media ￿rms earn higher pro￿ts. The reason
is that the increase in revenues from ads is greater than the reduction in revenues
from consumer payment.
4 Competition and sources of revenue
The parameters s and m can be interpreted as measures of competition among
the TV stations. If s increases, competition becomes tougher because the media
products are less di⁄erentiated, while an increase in m implies that competition
13becomes tougher due to a larger number of media ￿rms. It is therefore not surprising
that each media ￿rm￿ s pro￿t is decreasing in both of these parameters (d￿=ds < 0
and d￿=dm < 0; see Appendix for a proof): However, the relative importance of
advertising revenue compared to consumer payments depends crucially on whether
competition increases due to an increase in s or in m: To see this it is useful ￿rst to





The algebra becomes quite complex if we have an arbitrary number of advertisers. In
the main text we shall therefore focus on the limit case where n approaches in￿nity:
Assumption 2: Let n ! 1:
Assumption 2 de facto implies that the advertisers are price takers in the ad-
vertising market (they take ri as given). It further implies that each advertiser￿ s
advertising volume is so small that he rationally disregards the possibility that his
advertising volume has any e⁄ect on the attractiveness of each media product. We
believe that the latter is a reasonable approximation for most advertisers in most
media markets. In the Appendix we nonetheless show that Assumption 2 does not
signi￿cantly a⁄ect our main results.
Inserting for (8) - (11) into (13) and taking the limit value as n ! 1; the share
of consumer payments in each media ￿rm￿ s total revenue can be written as
S =
(1 ￿ s)m[m(2 ￿ s) + s]
[m(1 ￿ s) + s][m(2 ￿ s) ￿ s]
: (14)
4.1 The role of product di⁄erentiation
Lemma 1 showed that consumer payments are strategic complements, and adver-
tising prices are strategic substitutes. This has important implications for how
competition between media ￿rms works. Competition in strategic complements is
more aggressive than competition in strategic substitutes, and more so the less dif-
ferentiated the services are (see, for example Bulow et al. (1985) and Vives (1999)).
14Intuitively, we should therefore expect the media ￿rms to rely more on advertis-
ing revenue and less on consumer payments the closer substitutes the consumers
perceive the media products to be (the higher is s).
To understand the mechanisms at work, let us ￿rst point out a direct link between




4s(m ￿ 1)m2(2 ￿ s)
[m(s ￿ 2) ￿ s]2[m(s ￿ 2) + s]2 > 0: (15)
We have the following result:
Lemma 3: The less di⁄erentiated the media products (the higher s), the larger
the volume of advertising.
We thus see that the advertising volume increases if the media products become
closer substitutes. This is a consequence of the existence of a two-sided market and
the nature of competition in those two markets. Tougher competition in the content
market implies that the media ￿rms must rely more on the advertising market for
raising revenue.
Godes et al. (2009) also analyze the ￿nancing of media ￿rms, but they use
a framework which is very di⁄erent from ours. In particular, they assume that
the advertisers have a per se preference for spreading the ads over the di⁄erent
media outlets. Their modeling approach has the advantage that it allows them to
analyze competition in the advertising market even between media products which
the consumers consider as completely unrelated, but has the disadvantage that the
competitive pressure in the content market has no e⁄ect on the advertising volume.
More speci￿cally, this means that Godes et al. (in our notation) have dA=ds = 0:11




ms(m2 ￿ 1)(2 ￿ s)
[m(2 ￿ s) ￿ s]]2[m(2 ￿ s) + s]2 < 0: (16)
11Their modelling approach further implies that total advertising revenue is proportional to the
size of the audience. Holding the size of the audience ￿xed, Godes et al thus arrive at the result
that a greater substitutability between the media products (from the consumer￿point of view)




s(m ￿ 1)[m2(8 ￿ 2s ￿ s2) + s2 ￿ 2ms]
[m(2 ￿ s) ￿ s]
2 [m(2 ￿ s) + s]
3 > 0: (17)
We can state our ￿rst main results:
Proposition 1:
The less di⁄erentiated the media products (the higher s),
(i) the higher are the revenues from ads (d(rA)=ds > 0), and
(ii) the lower are the revenues from consumer payment (d(pC)=ds < 0).
Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 1 for m = 2: With our assumption that ￿ = 1; the
gains from selling advertising space are so low compared to the consumers￿distaste
for ads that a monopoly media ￿rm would prefer to be advertising-free. At s = 0
the media ￿rms thus raise all their revenue from consumer payments (A = 0 from
equation (10)). However, the closer substitutes the media products are, the more
￿ercely they compete to capture an audience. Since this will make it di¢ cult to
raise revenues from consumer payment, the media ￿rms will have to rely more on
the advertising market to raise revenue. If s ￿ 1 the media products are perceived
as (almost) perfect substitutes. At this extreme, they are unable to charge a price
that is higher than marginal costs on the consumer side of the market (p = 0 from
equation (9)). This follows directly from the result that consumer prices are strategic
complements (and the assumption that all media ￿rms have the same marginal costs,
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Figure 1: Revenue from consumers and advertisers (m = 2).
In contrast to our result, Godes et al (2009) ￿nd that it is ambiguous how dif-
ferentiation on contents a⁄ects ad revenues and revenues from consumer payment.
This is due to their application of a standard quadratic utility function, where one
and the same parameter captures both product di⁄erentiation and market size. In
their framework it is thus not possible to isolate the e⁄ects of a change in product
di⁄erentiation on the media ￿rms￿revenue. Technically, an increase in their para-
meter ￿ implies both that the products become less di⁄erentiated and that the size
of the market falls.12




ms(m ￿ 1)[m(4 ￿ 3s) + s]
[m(1 ￿ s) + s]
2 [m(2 ￿ s) ￿ s]
2 < 0: (18)
We can state:
Corollary 1: The share of consumer payment in the media ￿rms￿total revenue
is smaller the less di⁄erentiated the media products are (dS=ds < 0).
12See the explanation Godes et al. (2009) provide for their Result 4. This explanation is also
relevant for understanding their Result 3 and in particular their Result 3 (ii).
17Corollary 1 is directly related to Proposition 1, which shows that advertising
revenue is higher and consumer payments lower the less di⁄erentiated the media
products are (as in Godes et al, 2009). In the Appendix we prove that Corollary 1
is valid for an arbitrary number of n.
From equation (11) we ￿nd
dC=ds =
m ￿ 1
[m(2 ￿ s) + s]
2 > 0:
This implies:
Corollary 2: Other things equal, consumption of each media product is larger
the closer substitutes they are: dC=ds > 0.
To understand the intuition for Corollary 2, note that consumption of each media
product is a⁄ected in two opposing ways as s increases: Consumer prices go down,
and this has a positive impact on the size of the audiences. At the same time, the
amount of advertising goes up. In isolation, this tends to reduce the sales of the
media products. However, the former e⁄ect dominates. The reason for this is simply
that an increase in s means that competition increases, such that the media ￿rms￿
ability to utilize their market power over the consumer is reduced. Thereby the
size of the audiences is unambiguously higher the closer substitutes the media ￿rms
deliver, as stated in Corollary 2. Other things equal, this result is similar to what
we typically ￿nd in one-sided markets.
In combination, Corollary 1 and Corollary 2 predict that media ￿rms that are
mainly advertising ￿nanced have relatively large audiences. However, this is not
because they seek a broader audience as such. On the contrary, a media ￿rm with
large market power would in our model choose high user payments and accept a
relatively small audience. This ￿ts well with the observation that pay-TV channels
and newspapers with few close substitutes typically have high prices and small au-
diences. By the same token, one observes that electronic newspapers with unique
contents are able to charge their visitors directly, but that this reduces the number
of readers.
18A few words on how Assumptions 1 and 2 a⁄ect our results may be warranted.
First, the smaller is ￿, the less pro￿table is clearly the advertising market for the
media ￿rms. Secondly, it should be noted that n (the number of advertisers) can be
interpreted as a proxy for the media ￿rms￿market power over the advertisers - the
smaller is n, the less able the media ￿rms are to extract the pro￿t that advertising
generates. Both a lower value of ￿ and a smaller n thus reduce advertising revenue
for the media ￿rms. It nonetheless remains true that as s approaches one, the media
￿rms can make a pro￿t only from the ad market. Letting ￿ < 1 and n < 1 would
thus neither change the result that the media ￿rms prefer to be advertising free as
monopolies nor that they must rely solely on ad revenue if they are perceived as
perfect substitutes.
With ￿ > 1; we must distinguish between two cases: If ￿ is above a critical
value ￿crit; we reach a corner solution where the media ￿rms raise all their revenues
from advertising, no matter how poor substitutes the media products are. This
corresponds to the underpricing result in Godes et. al. (2009).13 If 1 < ￿ < ￿crit;
on the other hand, the media ￿rms will make pro￿ts from both the advertising and
the consumer side of the market for any s 2 [0;1): Proposition 1 still holds, though
- advertising revenue is more important and consumer payments less important for
the media ￿rms the higher s is. In this respect, Assumptions 1 and 2 are innocent
for our qualitative results.
In our model the advertising prices are determined by the media ￿rms. Alterna-
tively, the prices of advertising could be set in negotiations between advertisers and
media ￿rms.14 This is most relevant in the case with a limited number of advertis-
ers. In the Appendix we consider a Nash bargaining game between one advertiser
and two media ￿rms.15 Not surprisingly, we ￿nd that the more bargaining power
given to the advertiser, the lower the price of advertising. We further verify that
independent of the distribution of the bargaining power, the media ￿rms will rely
13This was discussed in detail in an earlier version of the paper, see Kind et al. (2005). In the
Appendix we show that, if m = n = 1, then we have underpricing if 3 <
￿
￿ < 3 + 2
p
2:
14We would like to thank one of the referees for suggesting this possibility.
15See Dukes and Gal-Or (2003) and Gal-Or and Dukes (2003) for an alternative setup of bar-
gaining between advertisers and media ￿rms.
19solely on consumer payments at s = 0 and solely on advertising revenue at s = 1.
Based on intuition from one-sided markets, one might expect that each media
￿rm will have less advertising revenue the smaller its bargaining power. However,
this is not necessarily the case. On the contrary, the media ￿rms￿advertising revenue,
both absolutely and relative to consumer payments, might be increasing in the
advertiser￿ s bargaining power (see Appendix). The reason for this is that each
media ￿rm will partly internalize the fact that a higher advertising volume reduces
the consumers￿willingness to pay for the media product; in general the media ￿rms
will therefore prefer to have fewer ads than the volume which maximizes advertising
revenue. The media ￿rms￿ability to internalize this e⁄ect is higher the greater is
their market power (i.e., the smaller is s and the higher is their bargaining power
over the advertiser). The advertiser will not take this e⁄ect into account. If he
has the power to do so, he therefore sets advertising prices which are so low that
the advertising volume becomes unduly high from the media ￿rms￿point of view.
This might generate higher advertising revenue for the media ￿rms, but the gain is
more than outweighed by reduced consumer payments (it is straight forward to show
that the media ￿rms￿pro￿t is decreasing in the advertiser￿ s bargaining power). Put
di⁄erently, more bargaining power to the advertiser leads to a lower price of ads,
which in turn causes the advertising levels and possibly the media ￿rms￿advertising
revenue to increase. However, more ads lead to a reduction in the consumption of
the media product, and thereby to less revenues from consumer payment.
4.2 The role of the number of media products
In this section we analyze how the ￿nancing of media ￿rms depends on the number
of competitors. First, let us consider a shift from monopoly (m = 1) to duopoly
(m = 2). From equation (14) we ￿nd
S(m = 2) ￿ S(m = 1) = ￿
s2
(4 ￿ 3s)(2 ￿ s)
< 0 for s > 0: (19)
20We can state:
Corollary 3: If the market structure changes from monopoly to duopoly, then
the relative importance of advertising revenue increases.
Note that S(m = 2) ￿ S(m = 1) = 0 if s = 0: Whether we have one or two
media ￿rms thus does not matter per se for the choice of business model. What
matters is instead whether there is competition between the media ￿rms. If there are
two media ￿rms in the market, then advertising revenue will be a more important
source of income if these ￿rms compete (s > 0) than if each of them has monopoly
power in its own market segment (s = 0).16 This is nothing but a special case
of Corollary 1. Not surprisingly, we therefore cannot generalize from this how the
relative importance of advertising revenue depends on the number of competing
media ￿rms.
Let us thus consider the e⁄ects of changing the number of media ￿rms, holding
the di⁄erentiation between the media products ￿xed. It is easily veri￿ed that both
advertising prices and consumer prices are decreasing in m. The e⁄ects of an increase




(1 ￿ s)[m2(4(1 ￿ s) + s2) + s2]




2m(2 ￿ s)[(2 ￿ s)m ￿ (3 ￿ s)] + s
[m(2 ￿ s) ￿ s]
2 [m(2 ￿ s) + s]
3 < 0 (for m ￿ 2) (21)
We have the following result:
Proposition 2: Assume that m ￿ 2 and s 2 (0;1): An increase in the number
of media ￿rms will then lead to lower revenues from both advertising and consumer
payment; d(pC)=dm < 0 and d(rA)=dm < 0.
Note the asymmetry between Proposition 1 and Proposition 2. If the competitive
pressure increases due to greater substitutability between the goods, one source of
revenue will increase (advertising) and the other will decrease (consumer payments).
16In the latter case S = 0; given Assumption 1.
21If the higher competitive pressure is caused by a larger number of rivals, on the other
hand, then both sources of revenue will fall for each ￿rm. Godes et al (2009) also
analyse ￿nancing of media ￿rms, but they do not address this question, since their
analysis is limited to cases of monopoly and duopoly.
Proposition 2 does not say anything about the relative importance of the two
revenue sources when the number of competitors increases. To focus on this issue,
suppose that new TV channels enter the market. Then the advertisers can reach
each viewer on a larger number of channels. Thereby each channel￿ s market power in
the advertising market falls, and the advertising price will approach marginal costs
as the number of TV channels increases. In the limit we ￿nd from equation (8) that
lim
m!1r = 0: (22)
In contrast, the consumers perceive the media products as imperfect substitutes
as long as s < 1: The media ￿rms will therefore have some market power over the
consumers, no matter how many media products there are on the market. This is





> 0 for s < 1: (23)
Equations (22) and (23) suggest that as the number of media ￿rms grows, they
will to an increasingly large extent have to rely on direct charges from the consumers.
We can state the following result:
Proposition 3: Assume that m ￿ 2 and s 2 (0;1): Then the share of con-
sumer payment in each media ￿rm￿ s total revenue is higher the larger the number of
rivals; dS=dm > 0.




s2 (1 ￿ s)[m(m ￿ 2)(2 ￿ s) ￿ s]
[m(1 ￿ s) + s]
2 [m(2 ￿ s) ￿ s]
2 > 0,
where the inequality can be shown to hold for all s 2 (0;1) and m ￿ 3. Inserting
for m = 2 and m = 3 into (14) we further have
S(m = 3) ￿ S(m = 2) =
s2 (1 ￿ s)
2
(3 ￿ 2s)
2 (2 ￿ s)(4 ￿ 3s)
> 0 for s 2 (0;1):
22In combination, Corollary 3 and Proposition 3 state that consumer payments￿
share of media ￿rms￿revenues is non-monotonically related to the number of ￿rms:
As we move from monopoly to duopoly, consumer payments￿share decreases. How-
ever, as the number of ￿rms is increased beyond duopoly, consumer payments￿share
increases. This shows that one should be careful with drawing conclusions about the
e⁄ects of increased competition merely from a comparison of monopoly and duopoly.
Figure 2, which measures s on the horizontal axis and S on the vertical axis,
illustrates how the share of consumer payments in each media ￿rm￿ s revenue (S)
depends on the number (m) and the substitutability (s) between the media products.
The upper and lower curves in the Figure are found by setting m = 10 and m = 2;
respectively, into equation (14). From Corollary 1 we know that dS=ds < 0: Both
curves are therefore downward-sloping: Consistent with Proposition 3 we further see
that S(m = 10) > S(m = 2) for all s 2 (0;1): Increased competition in the form of
higher substitutability versus a large number of competing media products thus has













Figure 2: Revenue sources
In the Appendix we prove that except for Proposition 3, all the propositions
23and corollaries hold also for any value of n: The quali￿cation we must make on
Proposition 3, is that dS=dm > 0 if m ￿ 3 if n < 1; the di⁄erence S(m =
3) ￿ S(m = 2) is then negative if s is below a critical value (this critical value is
lower the smaller is n, and reaches a minimum at s = 0:83 for n = 1). However, this
observation is of limited value, since it is hard to imagine a media industry where
the number of media competitors is lower than three. For all practical purposes, the
model therefore predicts that dS=dm > 0 independent of the number of advertisers.
Although our model is simple, we believe that our main result is quite robust.
When the number of media ￿rms approaches in￿nity, we predict that there is a
very limited scope for the media ￿rms to earn revenues from advertising. This is
simply because the market power of each media ￿rm in the advertising market then
becomes insigni￿cant. In the consumer market, on the other hand, each media ￿rm
will still have some market power as long as it produces a media product which is
di⁄erentiated from those of the rivals.
5 Some empirical observations
According to our theoretical predictions, media ￿rms face two qualitatively di⁄erent
competitive constraints. On the one hand, the scope for raising revenues from
consumer payment is constrained by other media ￿rms o⁄ering close substitutes.
On the other hand, the scope for raising revenues from ads is constrained by the
number of media ￿rms. Let us provide some examples, which we claim indicate that
the driving forces at work in our model are indeed present in media markets.
Media ￿rms on the Internet have to consider the trade-o⁄between consumer pay-
ments and ads, and we have seen various business models being used. As mentioned
in the introduction, in December 2005 CNN launched CNN Pipeline as an online
video news product ￿nanced purely by consumer payments and not by ads. The
business model was then totally reversed in June 2007. Consumer payments were
removed, and the service became ￿nanced purely by ads. Some commentators have
indicated that the change in business model was due to the fact that other close
24substitutes were launched.17 Such a change in business model is consistent with
our theory, since closer substitutes for the consumers should lead to less reliance on
subscription.
There seems to be a trend on the Internet towards less reliance on consumer
payments, but there are exceptions. CNN￿ s experience can be contrasted with
TV2 Sumo. The latter is a web page for the Norwegian broadcaster TV2, where
consumers can pay for watching various video programs.18 The most important
content on TV2 Sumo is live soccer matches from the Norwegian Premier League
("Tippeligaen"). TV2 has the exclusive right to broadcast these matches, which
implies that there are no close substitutes on the Internet. A business model based
on consumer payments is thus viable according to our results.
On the Internet we also have more traditional news web pages, where typically
printed newspapers launch an online version of the printed news. Also in this case we
observe di⁄erent business models. New York Times had a similar experience as CNN
Pipeline. They launched a subscription service called TimesSelect in September
2005, and removed the subscription in September 2007. Wall Street Journal, on
the other hand, continues to o⁄er online subscription.19 If you subscribe, you not
only receive updated online news, but you also have access to an online market data
center. This suggests that Wall Street Journal might o⁄er more unique content
than what TimesSelect did, i.e., that Wall Street Journal￿ s online service does not
have as close substitutes seen from the consumer￿ s perspective. A business model
with subscription for online Wall Street Journal, but not for TimesSelect, is then
consistent with our predictions.
It could be argued that technological progress is the main reason why TV chan-
17See the description of CNN Pipeline on Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CNN_Pipeline.
According to CNN, the subscription model was abandoned because there were too few
subscribers; see http://behindthescenes.blogs.cnn.com/2007/06/25/a-special-note-for-our-cnn-
pipeline-subscribers/.
18TV2 Sumo o⁄ers a menu of tari⁄s, where you can subscribe either weekly, montly or annually
or simply pay for watching one particular program. For details, see http://webtv.tv2.no/webtv/.
19The subscription fee is $ 1.99 per week for online service or $ 2.49 per week for online service
+ print journal, see https://order.wsj.com/sub/f2
25nels now rely more on consumer payments than they used to do. We certainly agree
with this claim; it is only with the advent of encrypted digital signals that it has
become possible for TV channels to charge their viewers directly (and it is digital
transmission technologies which have allowed the large increase in the number of TV
channels). However, our model suggests that digitalization of TV signals and fun-
damental economic forces might be complementary factors in explaining the growth
of pay-TV. As noted in the introduction, in the UK and the US we have witnessed
both a shift towards raising revenues through subscription and large technological
changes in this industry during the last few years. Similar developments have taken
place in other countries, for example through the replacement of analogue terrestrial
networks with digital terrestrial networks. This makes it possible for consumers to
watch a much larger number of TV channels. Such structural changes in the in-
dustry will according to our predictions undermine each TV channel￿ s prospects of
raising revenues from advertising. No surprise, then, that we observe a shift towards
more reliance on user payment than on revenues from advertising.
Clearly, there is reason to believe that the growth in internet newspapers has re-
duced the demand for printed newspapers. In this sense it is not surprising that the
number of printed newspapers has declined, raising their dependence on advertising
revenue in accordance with our model. Furthermore, the mechanisms we have high-
lighted suggest that their tendency to rely on advertising revenue should increase
the better substitutes the readers consider printed and electronic newspapers to be.
However, a further analysis of this issue requires a more elaborate model, which
takes into consideration the speci￿c characteristics of the two kinds of newspapers,
and the competitive forces within and between these two market segments. There
is also a need for empirical work to analyze how the internet has reduced the will-
ingness to pay for ads in traditional newspapers relative to the readers￿willingness
to pay for printed media.
266 Concluding remarks
The main purpose of this paper is to show how competitive forces may a⁄ect the
way media ￿rms raise revenue. It turns out that competition has an ambiguous
e⁄ect on the choice of business model. Tougher competition in the sense of closer
substitutability between the media products makes advertising revenue relatively
more important, while a larger number of media products (e.g. a larger number of
TV channels) increases the relative importance of direct payment from the audience.
Our analysis demonstrates that competition in media markets di⁄ers from what
we observe in most other industries. More speci￿cally, the two-sided nature of me-
dia markets implies that competition in consumer prices is qualitatively di⁄erent
from competition in advertising prices. As is the case in more traditional markets,
consumer prices are strategic complements: if one media ￿rm reduces the price it
charges from its audience, it will be optimal for the other ￿rms to do the same.
Advertising prices, on the other hand, are strategic substitutes; a price reduction
by one ￿rm leads to a price increase by the others. Competition in strategic com-
plements is generally more aggressive than competition in strategic substitutes, and
more so the less di⁄erentiated the products (see Bulow et al., 1985, and Vives, 1999).
This explains why we arrive at the result that the closer substitutes the competing
media ￿rms￿products are, the larger is the fraction of their revenue that comes from
advertising.
We argue that it is di¢ cult for media ￿rms to commit to quantity of advertising.
Moreover, since competition in strategic substitutes is weaker than competition in
strategic complements, in our model it is a dominant strategy for the media ￿rms to
compete in advertising prices rather than advertising quantities. Thus, the ￿rms do
not have incentives to make nonreversible commitments with respect to advertising
quantities. Future empirical and theoretical research should analyze how robust this
conclusion is. The observation that internet newspapers (and tv channels) which
are very close substitutes manage to raise signi￿cant advertising revenue supports
our argument that they compete in strategic substitutes on the advertising side.
The predictions from our theory have clear cut managerial implications. Media
27￿rms should watch carefully the competitive constraints they are facing when they
make a strategic choice concerning ￿nancing. In particular, they should determine
whether the main competitive constraint is (i) another media product that is viewed
on as a close substitute by the consumers or (ii) many other media ￿rms that are
good alternatives for the advertisers. In the former case it is di¢ cult for the media
￿rm to raise revenues from consumer payment, simply because consumers would
then switch to another media product. In the latter case it is di¢ cult for the media
￿rm to raise revenues from advertisers, because the advertisers would then switch to
other media ￿rms with a lower price on ads. As illustrated by the change in business
model for CNN Pipeline, it is very important for the media ￿rm to anticipate the
changing environment they will be facing in the near future. If CNN had anticipated
that quite soon after the introduction of their new service they would be challenged
by new rivals o⁄ering close substitutes, they would have realized that ￿nancing the
service by subscription could not be a viable business model. In the same manner,
TV channels should anticipate that the technological change will make more TV
channels available to the viewers and thereby reduce the prospects of raising revenues
from commercial breaks. Fortunately, the TV channels in the UK and the US seem
to have adapted better to such a change in the competitive constraint than what was
the case with CNN, as they have gradually shifted their ￿nancing from advertising
towards subscription fees.
Our model may be considered as a complement to research papers on media
economics that build on Hotelling and Salop frameworks.20 The advantage of the
Hotelling framework is that it makes it possible to endogenize the extent of hor-
izontal di⁄erentiation between the media products. However, a disadvantage of
both Hotelling and Salop is that the size of the market is typically given, such that
aggregate output is independent of whether there is any competition. In our frame-
work, competition leads to higher aggregate output, and we believe that this is a
reasonable prediction both in the media industry and in other markets. The main
motivation for our choice of framework, however, is that it allows us to analyze the
consequences of increasing the number of rivals in the market.
20See e.g. Anderson and Coate (2005), Gabszewicz et al (2004a, 2004b), and Liu et al (2004).
28In this study, we predict how some fundamental economic forces in the media
industry a⁄ect media ￿rms￿￿nancing. There should be scope for testing empirically
the validity of our model, compare this with the validity of other relevant models, and
in particular that of Godes et al (2009). One way to discriminate between the two
models is to test whether there is any relationship between the advertising volume
in a media outlet and the extent to which the competitors produce close substitutes.
According to Godes et al there should be no relationship, while our model indicates
a positive relationship. However, such a test must take into account idiosyncratic
institutional features of the media industry. For example, one should control for
the fact that some countries have upper limits on the amount of advertising on TV,
that contracts often are more complex than simple linear prices, and that list prices
on advertising can di⁄er signi￿cantly from actual prices. Empirical analyses must
further take into account the fact that some media ￿rms are vertically as well as
horizontally integrated, and that ownership concentration has increased over time.
7 Appendix
A) Equilibrium with an arbitrary number of advertisers
De￿ne N ￿ n
n+1. Note that N is monotonically increasing in n; varying from
N = 1=2 for n = 1 to N ! 1 as n ! 1:
A1) Proof that d￿
ds < 0 and d￿
dm < 0 for any n
Di⁄erentiating equation (12) with respect to s yields
d￿
ds
= s(m ￿ 1)
2 2s
￿
3m2 (2 ￿ s)
2 + s2￿
N ￿ [m(2 ￿ s) + s]
3
[m(2 ￿ s) + s]
3 ([m(2 ￿ s) ￿ s])
3 ;
where we note that d￿=ds is more likely to be positive the larger N is: Setting
N = 1 we ￿nd d￿=ds = ￿s(m ￿ 1)
2 [m(2 ￿ s) + s]
￿3 < 0; from which it follows
that d￿=ds < 0 for all feasible values of N. Q.E.D.




2s3 (2 ￿ s)(m ￿ 1)NT1 + (1 ￿ s)[m(2 ￿ s) + s]
3 T2
[m(2 ￿ s) + s]
3 [m(2 ￿ s) ￿ s]
3 ;
29where T1 ￿ 4m(1 ￿ s)(m ￿ 2) + s2 (m ￿ 1)
2 > 0 and T2 ￿ (2 ￿ s)(m ￿ 1) +
2(1 ￿ s)
2 > 0: Since all the terms both in the numerator and the denominator
are positive, it follows that d￿=dm < 0 for any value of N: Q.E.D.
A2) Proof of Proposition 1 for arbitrary values of n (d(rA)=ds > 0 and d(pC)=ds <
0)
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4Nm2s(m ￿ 1)(2 ￿ s)
[m(2 ￿ s) ￿ s]
2 [m(2 ￿ s) + s]
2 > 0; (24)
which proves Proposition 1 (i), that d(rA)=ds > 0:
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(m ￿ 1)(m(2 ￿ s) + s)
2￿
+
￿s2 z }| { ￿
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2 [m(2 ￿ s) ￿ s]
3 s￿1 (m ￿ 1)
￿1
(25)
The term ￿s1 is always positive for m ￿ 2; while ￿s2 might be negative for s > 4=5:
The absolute value of ￿s2 is increasing in N; such that we must have (￿s1 + ￿s2) >
0 for any N ￿ 1 if (￿s1 + ￿s2) is positive for N = 1: Suppose that N = 1: We then
￿nd
￿s1 + ￿s2 = m(2 ￿ s)(m + 1)[m(2 ￿ s) ￿ s] > 0; (26)
which implies that d(pC)=ds = C
dp
ds + pdC
ds < 0: This proves Proposition 1 (ii).
A3) Proof of Corollary 1 for arbitrary values of n (dS=ds < 0)










































2 < 0: Q:E:D:
30A4) Negotiations between one advertiser and two media ￿rms
Consider a context where we have two TV channels and one advertiser, and
where the advertiser bargains simultaneously with each of the tv channels over the
advertising price. We assume the same timing structure as in the main body of the
paper.
Subgame after bargaining breakdown: Suppose bargaining broke down between
channel 1 and the advertiser. Firms set consumer prices p1 and p2. Channel 2 and
the advertiser agree on advertising price r2. Channel 1 is without advertising. With
























p2 ￿ s(p1 + p2)=2
1 ￿ s
￿
















Thus, the pro￿t of the advertiser, in case of a breakdown at channel 1, is:
￿1t =
[2(1 ￿ s) ￿ (2 ￿ s)p2 + sp1 ￿ 4(1 ￿ s)r2]
2
16(2 ￿ s)(1 ￿ s)
TV channel 1, in case of a breakdown, has revenue only from consumers. Using










(s2 ￿ 8s + 8)






These are the threat points for the bargaining between TV channel 1 and the
advertiser. Similarly, we ￿nd the threat points for the bargaining between TV
channel 2 and the advertiser:
31￿2t =
[2(1 ￿ s) ￿ (2 ￿ s)p1 + sp2 ￿ 4(1 ￿ s)r1]
2









(s2 ￿ 8s + 8)






Subgame after successful bargaining: When bargaining does not break down in
either channel, there is advertising in both channels. We have the following demand






Ai ￿ s(Ai + Aj)=2
1 ￿ s
￿








[1 ￿ pi ￿ (2 ￿ s)ri ￿ srj] (29)
Now we need to ￿nd expressions for pro￿ts. Following prices (p1;p2;r1;r2) set in

































































Let ￿ 2 [0;1) denote the bargaining power of the advertiser, such that the
bargaining power of the advertiser is increasing in ￿ (the second-order conditions
do not hold in the limit ￿ = 1): In the main body of the paper we have treated the
case where ￿ = 0; such that each media ￿rm sets the advertising price in order to
maximize its own pro￿t.
The Nash product for the bargaining between TV channel i and the advertiser
for an arbitrary value of ￿ is:
NPi = (￿i ￿ ￿it)
1￿￿ (￿ ￿ ￿it)
￿
32Solving @￿i=@pi = @NPi=@ri = 0 simultaneously for i = 1;2 we ￿nd a unique,






4 ￿ (3 + ￿)s
(4 ￿ 3s)[4 ￿ (1 + ￿)s]
(31)
Because of symmetry we also have A = A1 = A2 and C = C1 = C2.Using





(4 ￿ 3s)[4 ￿ (1 + ￿)s]





(4 ￿ 3s)[4 ￿ (1 + ￿)s]
2 < 0:
This means that the higher the advertiser￿ s bargaining power, the higher the adver-
tising volume and the lower the price of advertising. The higher advertising level in





(4 ￿ 3s)[4 ￿ (1 + ￿)s]
2 < 0:







2 [4 ￿ (1 + ￿)s]




2(8 ￿ s2 ￿ 6s) ￿ s(2 + s)￿
(4 ￿ 3s)
2 [4 ￿ (1 + ￿)s]
3 R 0:
We thus see that revenue from consumer payments unambiguously is decreasing
in the advertiser￿ s bargaining power. However, the media ￿rms￿revenue from the
advertising market is increasing in the bargaining power of the advertiser unless
both ￿ and s are su¢ ciently large (in which case the media ￿rms have little ability
to internalize the externalities between the two sides of the market). Figure A1
thus illustrates that the share of consumer payments in the media ￿rms￿revenue is












Figure A1: The share of consumer payments in the media ￿rms￿revenue under
bargaining.
A5) Proof of Corollary 2 for arbitrary values of n (dC=ds > 0)
Di⁄erentiating (11) with respect to s we ￿nd
dC
ds
= (m ￿ 1)
[m(2 ￿ s) + s]
2 ￿ 4ms(2 ￿ s)N
[m(2 ￿ s) + s]
2 [m(2 ￿ s) ￿ s]
2 (32)
Equation (32) is less likely to be positive the larger is N: Setting N = 1; which
is its highest possible value; we ￿nd that





(m(2 ￿ s) + s)
2 > 0:
It follows that @C
@s > 0 for all feasible values of N: Q.E.D.
A6) Proof of Proposition 2 for arbitrary values of n (d(rA)=dm < 0 and d(pC)=dm <
0)





(m(2 ￿ s) ￿ s)





(m(2 ￿ s) + s)
2 < 0:




24m(1 ￿ s)(m ￿ 2) + s2 (m ￿ 1)
2
[m(2 ￿ s) ￿ s]
2 [m(2 ￿ s) + s]
2 < 0:




[m(2 ￿ s)(m ￿ 2s) + s2][m(2 ￿ s) + s]
2 ￿ s2 ￿
m2 (2 ￿ s)
2 (2m ￿ 3) + s2￿
N
m2 [m(2 ￿ s) ￿ s]
2 [m(2 ￿ s) + s]
2 ;
which is more likely to be positive the larger is N. It is straight forward to show
that dC
dm < 0 for N = 1: Thus, dC
dm < 0 for all feasible values of N:
Since each media ￿rm￿ s output and prices are decreasing in m; it follows that
d(rA)=dm < 0 and d(pC)=dm < 0: Q.E.D.
A7) Proof of Corollary 3 for arbitrary values of n (change from monopoly to
duopoly)
Using equations (8) - (13) we ￿nd
S(m = 2) ￿ S(m = 1) = ￿




2 + s3 (N ￿ 1)
￿ < 0: Q.E.D.
A8) The validity of Proposition 3 for arbitrary values of n (dS=dm > 0 for
m ￿ 2)




2 (1 ￿ s)
2s3 (m ￿ 1)




3 (m ￿ 1)
2 (2 ￿ s)N + (1 ￿ s)(m ￿ s)[m(2 ￿ s) + s]
2 > 0 and
￿ ￿ (2 ￿ s)
2 m
3 ￿ m
2 (2 ￿ s)(4 + s) + s(2 ￿ s)(5 + 2s)m ￿ s
2 (5 ￿ 2s):
The ￿rst term in the numerator of (33) is positive for all m ￿ 2 and increasing





; a su¢ cient condition for dS=dm being positive is that the
numerator of (33) is positive for N = 1=2: Setting N = 1=2 we can rewrite the
numerator of (33) to
T = T1 (2 ￿ s)m
2 + T2; (34)
where




6 ￿ 2s ￿ s
2￿
and T2 ￿ 2s
3 (2 ￿ s)m￿s
3 (3 ￿ s):
35The term T2 is positive for all m ￿ 1: A su¢ cient condition for T being positive is
therefore that T1 > 0: Factorization of T1 yields
T1 = (2 ￿ s)










2(1 ￿ s)(2 ￿ s) + s3
2 ￿ s
:
Since s 2 [0;1) we have t1 2 [0;1) and t2 2 [2;3): We thus see that a su¢ cient
(but not necessary) condition for dS=dm > 0 is that m ￿ 3:
Inserting for m = 3 and m = 2 into S shows that S(m = 3) ￿ S(m = 2) is
increasing in N; with S(m = 3) ￿ S(m = 2) > 0 for s > 0:83 with N = 1=2 and
S(m = 3) ￿ S(m = 2) > 0 for all s as N ! 1:
B) On underpricing of the media products
If the ratio (￿=￿) is su¢ ciently large it is optimal for the media ￿rms to set the
consumer price below marginal costs (while it is optimal to have no advertising if
the ratio (￿=￿) is su¢ ciently small). This is true for any m ￿ 1 and n ￿ 1; but to
simplify the algebra we consider only the case m = n = 1: From equation (3) we
then ￿nd that consumer demand for the media product equals
C = 1 ￿ ￿A ￿ p: (35)
As in the main text, we assume that the advertiser￿ s pro￿t equals (with m = n = 1)
￿ = ￿AC ￿ Ar: Solving @￿=@A = 0 s.t. (35), taking account of the non-negativity








The media ￿rm￿ s pro￿t function is given by equation ￿ = (p ￿ c)C +rA; which
corresponds to equation (1) in the main text except that we allow for positive mar-
ginal costs (c > 0): The ￿rm maximizes pro￿t with respect to p and R; subject to



























6￿=￿ ￿ 1 ￿ (￿=￿)
2





< 3 + 2
p
2:
36Solving @￿=@p = @￿=@r = 0 yields the ￿rst-order conditions
p =
(3￿=￿ ￿ 1)c ￿ (￿=￿)
2 + 3￿=￿
6￿=￿ ￿ 1 ￿ (￿=￿)
2 and r =
(1 ￿ c)(￿ + ￿)￿=￿
6￿=￿ ￿ 1 ￿ (￿=￿)
2 : (37)










6￿=￿ ￿ 1 ￿ (￿=￿)








6￿=￿ ￿ 1 ￿ (￿=￿)
2:
From (37) we ￿nd that









6￿=￿ ￿ 1 ￿ (￿=￿)
2,






C) On competing in advertising prices as a dominant strategy
It seems unreasonable to assume that the media ￿rms compete in quantities on
the consumer side. We will thus prove that it is a dominant strategy for the media
￿rms to compete in advertising prices instead of advertising quantities, given that
they compete in prices on the consumer side.
Assume that there are two media ￿rms; m = 2: If both compete in advertising
prices, we ￿nd from equation (12) that the pro￿t level of each ￿rm is equal to (with







Suppose that media ￿rm 1 deviates, and chooses advertising quantity as strate-
gic variable (the results would be symmetric if instead we assumed that the ri-
val deviated). Solving fp1;A1g = argmax￿1 and fp2;r2g = argmax￿2 we ￿nd
p1 = p2 =
2(1￿s)
4￿3s ;r2 = 4￿3s
16(1￿s)+s2 and A1 =
4s2(1￿s)
(4￿3s)(16(1￿s)+s2): The media ￿rms will





2 (4 ￿ s)
2




4(1 ￿ s)(4 ￿ 3s)
2








3 4(4 ￿ 3s)
2 ￿ 3s3
(2 ￿ s)(4 ￿ s)
2 (16(1 ￿ s) + s2)
2 < 0 for s > 0;
it is not pro￿table for media ￿rm 1 to deviate from an outcome where both ￿rms
compete in advertising prices.
Suppose next that both ￿rms compete in advertising quantities. Solving fp1;A1g =
argmax￿1 and fp2;A2g = argmax￿2 implies that neither of the media ￿rms will
have any advertising, and that p1 = p2 =
2(1￿s)





(1 ￿ s)(2 ￿ s)
(4 ￿ 3s)
2 :
If media ￿rm 2 deviates and chooses advertising price as strategic variable, we









2 > 0; it is pro￿table for
media ￿rm 2 to deviate.
Summing up, it follows that it is a dominant strategy for both ￿rms to choose
price rather than quantity as the strategic variable in the advertising market. Q.E.D.
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